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Abstract - Proponents of minority shareholder protection state that national legal institutions 
protecting small investors boost stock markets and, in turn, long-term countries’ performance. 
In this paper, we empirically challenge this argument. We perform three-stage least-square 
estimation on a sample of 48 countries over 1993-2006 and find that countries with stronger 
shareholder protection tend to have larger market capitalization but also lower innovation 
activity. We cope with stock market’s endogeneity and industry heterogeneity, and 
circumvent omitted variables bias, so that this finding is unlikely to be driven by 
misspecification problems. We interpret our estimation results arguing that stronger 
shareholder protection may depress, rather than encourage, the most valuable corporate 
productions, because it enables small and diversified shareholders to play opportunistic 
actions against undiversified stockholders, after specific investments are undertaken by the 
company; innovation activity, largely based on specific investing, is particularly exposed to 
this problem. 
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1.  Introduction. 
 
From the early work by Berle and Means (1932), during the all twentieth century, corporate 
scholars have been worrying about agency problems. An agency relationship is a contract under 
which a person (the principal) engages another person (the agent) to perform some service on his 
behalf, delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Arrow, 1985). If both parties to the 
relationship are utility-maximizers, the agent is unlikely to act in the interests of the principal. As a 
consequence, the principal’s welfare ends up reduced by an agency cost. The traditional theories of 
corporate governance maintain that the relationship between the shareholders and the managers of a 
modern corporation is a pure agency relationship (see, for instance, Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, and 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In particular, where large stockholders dominate shareholders’ 
meetings, small shareholders are exposed to the risk of expropriation, if managers are the expression 
of the will of the block-holders. From this point of view, national legal institutions constraining the 
discretion of majority shareholders and providing small or individual shareholders with effective 
legal means of control – commonly referred to as “investor protection” – should both increase 
corporations’ access to external capital and help corporations and countries enhance their long-term 
economic performance (La Porta et al., 1998, Rajan and Zingales, 1998, Pagano and Volpin, 2005). 
This view is largely acknowledged also by legal policymakers, as shareholder protection is on the 
top of the agenda in the United States and in many European countries (see, for example, the EU 
Directive 2007/36/EC, European Union, 2007). 
At the same time, the issue of how institutions of corporate governance affect innovation has 
become increasingly important (O’Sullivan, 2000, Carpenter et al., 2003). On the one hand, the 
corporate governance system influences the investment decision-makers and shape what type of 
investments they make, what in turn affects the innovation process. On the other hand, innovation is 
a strategic instrument for the firms and a source of comparative advantage and of opportunities for 
future growth; thus, at the macro-level, it is central to the dynamic through which market economies 
improve their performance relative to each other. 
In this paper, we argue that, while minority investor protection may positively affect stock 
markets, as a large part of the “law and finance” literature states, national institutions of shareholder 
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protection may also deter the most valuable corporate production strategies and depress innovation 
performance of countries. 
In knowledge intensive economies, a large part of corporate productions is based on specific 
investments, that lose much of their value-creating potential when switched from a certain use or a 
certain setting to another. In a context of specific investing, when the production project fails, 
investors can only partially recoup the value of their investment. As a result, if one of the project 
participants can credibly threaten the others to dismiss the undertaking in order to extract an 
additional gain from the relation at their expenses, the remaining investors, anticipating the risk of 
ex-post expropriation, may refrain from investing in the first place (Williamson, 1979). While the 
risk of opportunistic behavior between firm participants has been largely studied with respect to 
shareholder-manager and shareholder-worker relations in a traditional hold-up framework (see 
Gelter, 2009, for a comprehensive picture), proponents of shareholder protection commonly claim 
that it does not involve inter-shareholder relationships for one main reason. It is assumed that 
minority shareholders are motivated by a common and benign interest in improving corporate 
performance, what reduces the risk of opportunistic actions. Yet, the presumption that shareholders 
share a single economic goal is nowadays inaccurate: individual shareholders often have conflicts of 
interest with other shareholders arising from other relationships with the firm, from their investments 
in derivatives or securities of other corporations and from their investments in other parts of the 
corporation’s capital structure (Anabtawi and Stout, 2008). Thus, some of the shareholders may have 
protective outside options with respect to certain corporate projects, while others do not. Therefore, 
as one gives to individual shareholders (or shareholder groups) the power to easily oppose the other 
stockholders and so to influence the outcome of a particular corporate decision, he gives them also 
the capabilities to put strategic vetoes. The consequence may be inter-shareholder opportunism and 
ex-post rent extraction at the expenses of those who are the most sensitive to the corporate results. If 
the undiversified controlling shareholders anticipate this risk, they will refrain, in a defensive 
strategy, from allocating corporate capital to specific (and irreversible) investments. In our opinion, 
knowledge-intensive productions, aimed at generating innovation, are especially exposed to this 
problem, given the high specificity of the investments they require (Dosi et al., 1988), so that a 
2 
stronger shareholder protection may depress, rather than encourage, the most valuable corporate 
productions. 
Does the empirical evidence support this concern? This paper is aimed at answering this question. 
In particular, we analyze data on innovation and shareholder protection over 1993-2006 from a 
sample of 48 countries and find that countries with stronger investor protection (i.e. legal doctrines 
provide small stockholders with a stronger ability to oppose majority shareholders in the corporate 
decision-making process) show lower innovation activity, as our theoretical intuition predicts. 
Skeptics may rise two arguments against attributing causality. 
First, innovation and shareholder protection may be linked through other variables such as the 
access of corporations in the economy to external capital. Since shareholder protection (in certain 
models of corporate finance) affects the size of countries’ stock market and financial development 
influences innovation activity, it may not be surprising that shareholder protection and innovation 
are correlated. 
Second, a measure of financial development, if included in a single-equation model, may result 
correlated with innovation because of reverse causality: the stock market may be partially driven by 
the corporations’ innovation activity, to the extent that shareholders do not wait that the innovation 
has commercial success and go public to take advantage of the stock market evaluation of the 
innovation. 
In this paper, we cope with these problems by estimating a two-equation system in which the 
market capitalization is explicitly modeled as an endogenous variable. Moreover, we undertake 
cross-section regressions along with panel analysis of both total and sector specific countries’ 
innovation, and control for those factors (such as labor market institutions and patent endowment) 
that are commonly advocated to strongly affect country innovation activity. We also check the 
robustness of the estimation results to different measures of innovation and shareholder protection 
and to the presence of unobservable time-invariant country factors. In doing so we are confident in 
interpreting our findings in a causal sense. 
Our paper relates closely to the literature on minority shareholder protection, that has been 
developed both in the economic and in law debate. Proponents of the so-called “shareholder 
democracy” establish the desirability of the empowerment of individual (or small) stockholders on 
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the argument that, if minority shareholder protection sustains larger stock markets (La Porta et al., 
1998, Pagano and Volpin, 2005) and if more developed financial markets shape corporate 
performance and economic growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), also a positive relationship between 
minority shareholder protection and long-run economic performance must be true. Specifically, a 
common assumption in the literature is that controlling shareholders who hold a large fraction of 
firm’s shares prefer lower return projects in order to be exposed to a lower risk, while small 
investors have a genuine interest in long-term corporate results (see, e.g., Dhillon and Rossetto, 
2009). A contrasting body of research strongly challenges this view, suggesting that minority 
shareholder protection may encourage opportunistic actions played by small activist shareholders. 
While Gordon (1991) defines shareholders as “multi-principals”, more recently Anabtawi (2006), 
Stout (2007) and Anabtawi and Stout (2008) have explored the potential consequences of strategic 
interaction between shareholders in a context of heterogeneous interests, and maintained that also 
minority investors are likely to play rent extraction at the expenses of large shareholders, when they 
have the ability to affect business decisions in a self-serving way, what in turn may be a restraining 
factor of specific investing and value-creating productions. This paper provides empirical evidence 
consistent with such an argument, showing that stronger national legal institutions of minority 
shareholder protection may favour inter-shareholder opportunism problems in knowledge intensive 
productions and depress countries’ innovation abilities. We depart from the existing empirical 
literature on shareholder protection in two ways. First, many empirical studies have investigated the 
potential profitability-enhancing role of shareholder control (see Short, 1994, for a comprehensive 
survey), but they focus only on the degree of ownership concentration and disregard legal control 
power of individual or small shareholders, that, instead, is central in our analysis. Second, data on 
minority shareholder rights have been extensively used to explain the corporate ownership structure 
and equity market capitalization from a national perspective (for a survey see Denis and McConnell, 
2003), but the effect of such rights on long-run country outcomes and innovation has never been 
explored. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the theoretical 
motivation for our empirical study. In section 3 we describe the variables that we use in the 
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estimation. In section 4 we explain our econometric strategy, while the estimation results are 
presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical motivation 
 
Behind the alleged need of shareholder empowerment, corporate theories generally conflates two 
different elements: on the one hand, the need of reducing the non-shareholders’ capacity to siphon 
off benefit for themselves, by increasing the shareholder influence on managerial decision-making 
within managers’ legitimate business judgment, and, on the other, the need of shareholder protection 
against discretional activity by controlling shareholders, what calls for increasing minority 
shareholder protection and control rights. While the negative consequences of shareholder influence 
(namely, the hold-up risk for non-shareholder constituencies, especially workers) have been largely 
explored by corporate governance research (e.g., Gelter, 2009), the dark side of shareholder 
protection has received little attention, as corporate theories commonly describe minority 
shareholders as they have a common interest in improving corporate performance. Nevertheless, the 
long-standing idea that shareholders have homogeneous interests is no longer accurate (Gordon, 
1991, Anabtawi, 2006, Stout, 2007, Anabtawi and Stout, 2008). Specifically, a fault line separating 
shareholders is the extent to which (and how) their portfolios are diversified. Heterogeneity of 
financial investors is due, for example, to different degrees of risk aversion and to different 
capabilities to handle complex portfolios. While undiversified stockholders are those who have their 
wealth disproportionately invested in a given company (e.g. inside shareholders and founding family 
shareholders), small diversified shareholders, such as mutual funds and hedge funds, are often 
characterized by their ownership across a wide spectrum of the stock market and so reduce firm-
specific risk or even eliminate it under certain circumstances (Gilson and Black, 1993). As a 
consequence, on the one hand, undiversified shareholders are highly sensitive to corporate outcomes, 
while, on the other, (extensively) diversified shareholders can become indifferent to the firm’s 
individual shocks. For instance, after an investment project is chosen, a given shareholder may enter 
into a derivatives contract with an investment bank to hedge away his economic interest in the 
corporation, in a way such that, if the project fails, the investment bank, and not the hedged 
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shareholder, will bear the loss. It follows that how shareholders take their decisions about production 
strategies depends on who the shareholder is.  
In the presence of different private interests, an increase of small shareholder control rights may 
give shareholders the ability to affect the decision-making process in a self-serving way, despite the 
shareholder voting principle of majority rule. Indeed, when one shareholder can easily threaten a 
proxy contest and remove directors or bring lawsuits against other stockholders (irrespective of 
whether they are justified or not), he can also use direct negotiations with the other shareholders to 
bargain for his private interests. Thus, non-cooperative bargaining between heterogeneous 
shareholders may occur as the property rights literature predict in other contexts (see, e.g., Hart and 
Moore, 1990).  
In knowledge intensive productions, a non-cooperative inter-shareholder relationship can easily 
lead to inter-shareholder opportunism. Innovation processes require specific investments in order to 
be performed (Dosi et al., 1988), and they lose most of their value when they fall apart before being 
completed. As a result, when each shareholder, or shareholder group, has a sort of veto power over 
corporate productions, a given diversified shareholder can also bargain for an undue rent, after the 
(specific) investment decision is taken, at the expenses of those undiversified shareholders that have 
all their shares in the individual project or corporation. Consider the following example. An 
extensively diversified shareholder A can credibly threaten an undiversified shareholder B to put the 
veto over an innovative production (after the investment has already been undertaken) and can 
propose to take a large share of the final outcome (e.g., by diverting the profits into an entity in 
which A’s share is higher), leaving, through a lower shares’ value, a final derisory payoff to B. If B 
anticipates A’s threat, B will choose a sub-optimal (non-specific) investment strategy ex-ante, which 
may consist in a short-term non-innovative production with a lower but certain profit. Phrased 
differently, when a given shareholder’s economic interests are not tied-up to an individual corporate 
project (with a low salvage value) and the shareholder is likely to exercise an ex-post strategic veto 
over it, the benefits that the other shareholders should give him as a “bribe” to let the production end 
may be too high; so that, if the undiversified shareholders anticipate this risk, they will refuse to 
undertake the specific investment ex-ante, as a defensive strategy.  
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Many observers direct growing attention to the potential negative effects of inter-shareholder 
opportunism on value-creating productions as well as to the need for fiduciary duties for small 
activist shareholders (on this point see Anabtawi and Stout, 2008). For example, Solomon et al. 
(1998), among others, report several cases of conflicts of interest between shareholders that gave rise 
to opportunistic behavior and in turn distorted corporate investment strategies. This concern is also 
consistent with the troubling scenario that might arise in consequence of the derivatives revolution 
and other capital markets developments, as some authors predict. In particular, Hu and Black (2006) 
remark that the so-called “empty voting” strategies can drive business policies to inefficient 
investment decisions: if a shareholder has some control power while simultaneously enters into a 
derivatives contract to hedge away his economic interest, he can also credibly threaten the other 
stockholders in order to obtain a private gain at their expenses. 
It follows that knowledge intensive productions are especially exposed to such a problem, since 
they are largely based on sunk investments. Specifically, inter-shareholder opportunism may cause a 
crash in what Carpenter et al. (2003) call “strategic control”, i.e. the set of relations that gives 
strategic decision-makers both the incentives and the abilities to allocate firm’s resources to 
innovative investment strategies. Thus, in countries where corporate law ensures strong shareholder 
protection, innovative productions would be depressed, rather than fostered, if the benefits of a 
reduction of firm internal agency costs and block-holders’ discretion are outweighed by the costs of 
inter-shareholder opportunistic actions and of incentive distortions in corporate investment 
decisions. Consider, for instance, United States, United Kingdom and Canada, which are high-
income, common law countries with comparable equity markets and financial systems. Consistent 
with our argument, United States, in which corporate law is shareholder-unfriendly in the aspects 
relevant here (see Spamann, 2006), show a high level of innovation activity, of about 90 patents per 
million inhabitants every year. Differently, United Kingdom and Canada, where minority investors 
are better protected (see, again, Spamann, 2006), show a lower patent activity, around, respectively, 
60 and 30 patents per million inhabitants every year. Furthermore, at least from a descriptive point of 
view, differences in innovation performance between United States, United Kingdom and Canada 
are unlikely to be driven by differences in labor market institutions and productive structures (United 
States have a labor market slightly less rigid than that of United Kingdom and Canada and an 
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industry share of GDP slightly lower). So shareholder protection seems to affect innovation 
performance of countries in the way predicted. Looking at a larger sample of countries, the 
relationship between institutions of minority shareholder protection and innovation is more difficult 
to detect, given the (possibly) counterbalancing effects that shareholder protection institutions may 
play on innovation activity both directly and indirectly through financial markets, as Figure 1 shows. 
We explore this relationship more systematically in the rest of the paper. 
 













































































































































































































Note: minority shareholder protection = Spamann’s 1996 index (Spamann, 2006), innovation = logarithm of the 
number of patents of 1997-2006 period weighted by the country’s population, market capitalization = logarithm of 
the 1996 market capitalization as % of country’s GDP. 
 
3.  Data 
 
In order to perform the empirical analysis, we collect a novel dataset in which we link information 
on legal shareholder protection to the aggregated innovation performance of corporations using data 
from various sources over the 1993-2006 period. Specifically, we are aimed at studying the effect of 
legal shareholder control on innovation activity at the country level, controlling for the market 
capitalization and other factors, the market capitalization being considered as an endogenous 
variable. So, as a first step, we define appropriate indicators for both innovation performance and 
shareholder protection at the country level (sub-section 3.1 and sub-section 3.2). Then, we choose 
the control variables (sub-section 3.3). 
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3.1. Innovation activity. 
 
Dealing with innovation in econometric estimation can be problematic.  
A first problem involves the measure of innovation. Generally, two indicators are used to measure 
innovative activity: an input measure, R&D spending (see, for example, Lanjouw and Schankerman, 
2004), and an output measure, the number of patents (e.g., Bound et al., 1984). Both these indicators 
have some disadvantages. On the one hand, R&D spending is an imperfect proxy for innovation 
activity, since not all innovations are generated within formal R&D programs; on the other, the 
number of patents does not capture those innovations that are protected by trade secrets. In our 
estimation, we consider both the aggregated number of patents awarded by the corporations of a 
given country and the R&D spending of the private sector (as a % of GDP) as indexes of innovation 
performance. In particular, for the number of patents we use data from the European Patent Office 
(2008), for R&D spending we consider data from the World Development Indicators’ database 
(World Bank, 2008). 
A second problem concerns the time horizon within which to consider countries’ innovation 
activity. While the R&D spending should be immediately affected by investment decisions, 
innovation programs take time to get to a patent, so that to consider the number of patents awarded 
within one year after the investment decision is limitating. For example, Ho et al. (2006) report that 
the average duration of innovation projects is between five and ten years. In our empirical analysis, 
we use data for periods of five and ten years between 1993 and 2006. Notice that unreported 
estimation results, obtained using shorter periods, lead to substantially similar conclusions. 
Using the number of patents causes a third problem, related to inter-country comparisons. To 
weight the number of patents by GDP seems an obvious strategy in order to make country data 
validly comparable. However, a two-way relation between number of patents and GDP may generate 
estimation bias. We weight the country’s total amount of patents both by its population and its GDP 
in different model specifications, in order to check the robustness of the estimation results (for GDP 
and population, we use data from the World Development Indicators’ database, World Bank, 2008). 
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3.2. Shareholder protection. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) develop the so-called “anti-director rights index” that is routinely used as a 
measure of (small or individual) shareholder protection in cross-country quantitative studies (see, 
among others, Pagano and Volpin, 2005, and the revised index by Djankov et al., 2008). This index 
measures “how strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders against managers or dominant 
shareholders in corporate decision-making process” (La Porta et al., 1998, p. 1127) and assesses the 
minority shareholder ability to elect and remove directors. The shareholder protection index, 
originally compiled by La Porta et al. (1998) for 1996, has been extended by Pagano and Volpin 
(2005) to the entire interval between 1993 and 2002. This is the variable that we use as an indicator 
of legal shareholder protection. The shareholder anti-director rights index that we consider is formed 
by adding 1 when the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, shareholders 
are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, cumulative voting 
or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed, an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place, the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder 
to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to the sample median (10%), 
or shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. The final 
index ranges from zero to six. Furthermore, we perform a robustness check in which we use the 
revised index by Spamann (2006), which employs the same variable definition of Pagano and Volpin 
(2005) but proposes a different coding, as we will further discuss in the next section.  
 
3.3. Control variables. 
 
As a first control we use the logarithm of countries’ market capitalization. Market capitalization is 
the share price times the number of shares outstanding, as % of GDP (the source of data is World 
Bank, 2008). Several studies emphasize that, when corporations face internal financing constraints, 
new equity has some advantages over debt for financing high-tech investments: equity finance does 
not require the corporation to post collateral, investors’ upside returns are not bounded, and 
additional equity financing does not increase the probability of financial distress. For example, 
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Bradley  et al. (1984) and Long and Malitz (1985) show empirically that there is a negative 
relationship between a firm’s leverage and its intangible assets, and Carpenter and Petersen (2002) 
find that countries with relatively well developed markets for new equity have a comparative 
advantage in the production of high-tech goods.  
As a second control, we consider an index of worker participation to allow for firm internal 
commitments between employees and employer and for specific human capital development (we 
define worker participation as the employee participation to the management decision-making and 
use data collected from International Labour Organization, 2007, and Kluge and Stollt, 2006; in 
accordance with its qualitative nature, the variable is coded as “high” in the case of widespread 
participation rights, “medium” in the case of limited participation rights, and “low” when 
participation rights are absent or very limited). Michie and Sheehan (1999), for example, show that 
the employee participation is positively correlated with the likelihood of firms innovating. We also 
substitute the worker participation rights index with an indicator of the degree of employment 
protection in one model specification, in order to check the robustness of the results to measurement 
errors. In particular, where this substitution is made, we use an overall summary indicator of 
employment protection provided by OECD (2009), that is calculated as a weighted sum of 12 sub-
indicators relating to regular contracts. 
Third, we include the country’s industry share as % of GDP from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2008). In particular, the industry share is divided in three classes in order to 
minimize problems due to influential outliers (“low” if the industry share is lower than 25%, 
“medium” if it is between 25% and 50%, “high” if it is greater than 50%). 
Fourth, we consider the weighted number of patents awarded by the corporations of a given 
country in the year preceding the considered period. In this way, also the autoregressive component 
of patents data is explicitly modeled in our analysis and estimated. As Pagano and Rossi (2004) 
argue, given technological interdependencies in knowledge intensive productions, countries with 
higher endowments of patents tend to acquire further innovation abilities, while other countries may 
be trapped in equilibria where they do not acquire intellectual assets because they do not have 
innovation abilities and they do not acquire the abilities because they do not have intellectual assets.  
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Finally, as we have mentioned above, the market capitalization must be modelled as an 
endogenous variable, since a set of shareholder protection rights may be one of the determinants of 
the breadth of equity markets. In the absence of minority shareholder protection, potential block-
holders may expropriate small stockholders, so that the latter anticipate lower returns and are 
unwilling to buy shares in the first place (La Porta et al., 1998, Pagano and Volpin, 2005, Djankov et 
al., 2008). In particular, in our model, the market capitalization is allowed to react to the shareholder 
protection index, the worker participation rights to the corporate decision-making (as suggested by 
Roe, 2003; the definition of this variable is the same of that used as an explanatory variable for 
innovation),
2 the GDP per capita expressed in purchasing-power-parity, the rule of law and the 
government independence. The rule of law and the government’s independence measure, 
respectively, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights and courts, and the degree of 
government’s independence from political pressure (source: World Bank, 2009). Again, we employ 
a further model specification where the worker participation rights index is substituted with the 
employment protection index by OECD (2009). 
 
4.  Econometric strategy 
 
The estimation’s objective is to estimate the effect of an increase of legal shareholder protection on 
innovation activity (measured either by number of patents or R&D spending), also controlling for a 
vector of covariates. We start performing panel estimation. This allows us to tackle possible 
misspecification problems and omitted variable bias, since it enables us to take advantage of the 
intertemporal variability of the observed information set.  
As we have mentioned in the previous section, countries’ innovation activity and legal shareholder 
protection may be linked in a similar pattern through their relation with a common variable (namely, 
the market capitalization), what may cause a spurious relationship. In order to address this problem, 
we explicitly model the market capitalization. We consider the following cross-country two-equation 
model: 
                                                 
2 Roe (2003) argues that, in some countries, firm’s founders seek to preserve concentrated ownership 
because of strong employees rights, so that the two institutions of worker participation and block 
ownership may be linked in a power counterbalancing dynamics. 
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it i it it it c Pr Sh MkCap υ η δ + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = ) ( Ω θ                                                                                   (2) 
Symbols have the following meaning: InniΔt measures innovation activity of country i in a five-year 
interval Δt, ShPrit is the shareholder protection index for country i at date t, MkCapit is the logarithm 
of market capitalization, Φit and Ωit are two vectors of controls, ci is a time constant variable that 
captures the effect of unobserved countries’ heterogeneity; α, β, γ, δ, η, and θ define the parametric 
structure (in particular α and δ are the two model constants, and γ and θ are the vectors of the 
controls’ parameters), while εit and υit are the error terms. The vector Φit contains MkCapit, 
WorkPartit (worker participation), EmPrit (employment protection), Indit (industry share) and Patit 
(number of patents previously awarded); the vector Ωit includes Gdpit (GDP per capita), Ruleit (rule 
of law), Govit (government’s independence), WorkPartit and EmPrit. Variables’ descriptions are 
given in the previous section, while descriptive statistics are collected in Table 1. Notice that, when 
we use the number of patents as an index of innovation activity, InniΔt is calculated over intervals of 
five years; while, when we use R&D spending as an index of innovation, the dependent variable is 
Innit, which denotes the R&D spending at date t. The base sample that we use is the largest possible 
given the data availability (48 countries).
3 Given that we employ panel data on shareholder 
protection for the 1993-2002 period, we should be able to exploit 480 observations. However, some 
year data are missing for Iceland, Ireland, Israel and Uruguay, so that we use 476 observations in 
some panel model specifications. It follows that our panel of data is an “unbalanced panel” since we 
observe a different number of observations for different countries. Moreover, we can consider only 
OECD countries when we use the employment protection index (EmPrit) and data for some years are 
missing for some OECD countries, as a consequence the sample size is reduced to 139 observations 
in one panel model specification. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (cross-country data, all industries).  
   C ROSS-SECTION SAMPLE P ANEL SAMPLE 
VARIABLE   M EAN S TD. DEV. MEAN   S TD.DEV. 
            
Inn (patents, weight: pop. in millions)
 †   503.466  839.986  259.461    442.671 
Inn (patents, weight: GDP in billions of US $)    --  --  11.131    16.643 
Inn (R&D, % GDP)    1.289  0.995  1.346    1.065 
ShPr 
‡
   2.979  0.923  3.310  1.224 
WorkPart (low = 0, medium = 1, high = 2)   0.469  0.738  0.469  0.732 
EmPr     --  --  2.154    0.871 
MkCap   3.627  0.995  3.688  1.056 
Pat (weight: pop. in millions)    35.872  61.335  45.043    79.458 
Pat (weight: GDP in billions of US $)    --  --  1.880    2.907 
Ind (low = 0, medium = 1, high = 2)    1.980  0.468    1.947    0.480 
Gdp     12408  10934  12480    1100 
Gov   0.914  1.094  1.056  1.064 
Rule   0.697  0.995  0.702  0.998 
 
† Inn is calculated over five-year intervals in the panel sample, while over a ten-year interval in the cross-section 
sample. 
‡ ShPr: default rules in panel data, mandatory rules in cross-section data. 
 
Notice that, in our operative model, we meet identification requirements by using two excluded 
instruments in equation (2), namely an indicator of the rule of law and the government’s 
independence index. As suggested by La Porta et al. (1997) the character of legal rules and the 
quality of law enforcement have large effects on the breadth of capital markets across countries, 
while they do not show a statistically significant correlation with innovation. So, there is no more 
than one structure that can lead to the same reduced form, therefore we can estimate the structure.  
As equations (1) and (2) show, we allow innovation activity to react to shareholder protection 
rights and market capitalization and, simultaneously, market capitalization to react to the shareholder 
protection. Consequently, εit is likely to be correlated with MkCapit. Thus, we jointly estimate the 
two equations using a three-stage least square procedure (3SLS hereafter). The three steps in the 
3SLS method are the following. The first step is identical to the first step of a two-stage procedure 
(2SLS): the predicted values of each endogenous variable on all the exogenous regressors are 
obtained. In the second step, we substitute the predictions of the market capitalization found in the 
first step in place of MkCapit on the right hand side of equation (1) and apply OLS, the residuals are 
then used to obtain an estimate of the covariance matrix of the error terms of the two equations. In 
the third step, the estimate of the cross-equation correlation matrix is used as a weighting matrix to 
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calculate the generalized least square estimator (GLS). The last two steps are iterated over the 
estimated disturbance covariance and parameter estimates until the parameter estimates converge. 
 
5.  Estimation results 
 
5.1. Basic regressions. 
 
Table 2. Cross-country estimation results: basic regressions (3SLS, all industries). 






             
VARIABLE    INN as:  
Patents - weight: pop. - 
INN as: 
Patents - weight: GDP - 
INN as: 
R&D (% GDP) 
                 
Eq. 1. Innovation    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)   Coef.  (Std.Err.) 
                 
ShPr 
†    -20.801  (7.368) ***    -0.842  (0.302) ***    -0.300  (0.112) *** 
MkCap     49.907  (16.286) ***     2.086  (0.690) ***     2.114  (0.398) *** 
WorkPart (low)    benchmark      benchmark        --    -- 
WorkPart (medium)     37.837  (17.051) **     1.544  (0.681) **      --    -- 
WorkPart (high)     98.997  (22.316) ***     4.813  (1.001) ***      --    -- 
EmPr      --    --      --    --     0.251  (0.155) 
Ind (low)    benchmark      benchmark        --    -- 
Ind (medium)     14.009  (16.329)     0.705  (0.652)      --    -- 
Ind (high)     66.126  (35.916) *     3.831  (1.472) ***      --    -- 
Pat     4.813  (0.141) ***     4.769  (0.173) ***      --    -- 
Constant    -107.053  (46.199) ***    -4.438  (1.909) **    -6.490  (1.688) *** 
                 
Eq. 2. Market Cap.    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)   Coef.  (Std.Err.) 
                 
ShPr 
†     0.174  (0.034) ***     0.175  (0.034) ***     0.105  (0.045) ** 
WorkPart (low)    benchmark      benchmark        --    -- 
WorkPart (medium)    -0.289  (0.114) **    -0.278  (0.114) **      --    -- 
WorkPart (high)    -0.597  (0.145) ***    -0.584  (0.145) ***      --    -- 
EmPr      --    --      --    --    -0.105  (0.063) * 
Gdp      0.001  (0.000) ***     0.001  (0.000) **     0.001  (0.000) *** 
Rule     0.467  (0.069) ***     0.490  (0.069) ***      --    -- 
Gov      --    --      --    --     0.196  (0.091) ** 
Constant     2.690  (0.127) ***     2.698  (0.127) ***     3.140  (0.266) *** 
                 
STATISTICAL DETAILS:             
                 
Number of obs.      476      476      139 
Wald test - eq. (1): p-value 0.000      0.000      0.000 
Wald test - eq. (2): p-value 0.000      0.000      0.000 
I stage fit [R-square]    0.375     0.374     0.307 
Sargan test [H0, at 1%]  accepted       accepted     accepted 
                
                
Note: “*” = 10% significance, “**” = 5% significance, “***” = 1% significance. 
† ShPrit: default rules. 
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Table 2 reports the estimation results of the basic panel model specifications. The two-equation 
parameters, simultaneously estimated, are reported one after the other. While the left column reports 
the variables, the remaining columns report the estimated parameters of the various model 
specifications. Specifically, models (1), (2) and (3) are panel model specifications in which 
innovation activity is measured by, respectively, the number of patents of a five-year period 
weighted by the country’s population, the number of patents of a five-year period weighted by the 
country’s GDP and the R&D spending of a given year as a % of the country’s GDP, so as to check 
the robustness of the results to different measures of innovation. 
The parameter estimates are broadly stable across the various model specifications and provide 
strong support to our theoretical argument of a negative effect of shareholder protection on 
knowledge intensive productions. In particular, we find that an increase of the shareholder protection 
index (ShPr) has a negative and statistically significant effect on innovation activity of countries 
(Inn), also controlling for a potential spurious relationship through the market capitalization. This is 
shown by all the considered model specifications. Although we cannot observe directly how 
investment decisions within corporations vary across countries along with different levels of 
shareholder protection, we interpret this result as a signal for the presence of inter-shareholder 
opportunism when heterogeneous shareholders can easily affect business decisions in those 
productions that require specific investments, such as innovation activities. Indeed, it is true that 
shareholder empowerment might reduce corporate innovation also by means of a reduction in the 
incentives for other stakeholders (primarily workers) to undertake firm specific investing, according 
to a traditional hold-up scheme. Nevertheless, in our estimation we use a shareholder protection 
index that specifically measures minority shareholders’ intervention power, while the risk of hold-up 
of workers by shareholders as a class is captured by the worker participation and employment 
protection indicators.  
Further interesting results are obtained. First, shareholder protection, as suggested by La Porta et 
al. (1998), may positively affect the market capitalization (MkCap); the market capitalization results 
to be also negatively affected by the worker participation rights (WorkPart) and the employment 
protection legislation (EmPr), consistently with the argument by Roe (2003), and it is linked with the 
GDP per capita (Gdp), rule of law (Rule) and government’s independence (Gov) by a positive 
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relation. Second, worker participation rights have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
innovation activity (when the latter is measured by the number of patents). This finding may support 
the idea that worker participation and legal protection motivate employees to apply their skills and 
effort to collective learning processes, enhancing the corporate knowledge base and innovation 
activity (Michie and Sheehan, 1999). However, to the extent that workers may play rent-seeking 
actions, the positive effect of worker participation on innovation activity is partially compensated by 
its negative effect on the incentives of financial investors to contribute their money to the 
corporation, what is shown by the negative sign of the parameters associated to WorkPart and EmPr 
in equation (2). Third, the number of patents previously awarded by the corporations of a given 
country (Pat) is statistically relevant in explaining the amount of its subsequent innovations, what 
highlights the cumulative nature of technological innovation in knowledge intensive productions. 
The industry share (Ind) turns out statistically significant only when greater than 50%. 
Finally, we perform a diagnostic analysis of our results. First, we have checked relevance and 
exogeneity of the instruments used in the estimation. In order to test the relevance condition, as 
recommended by Bound et al. (1995), we have examined the first stage R-square, which, in our 
model specifications, is greater than 0.3, that is the commonly used rule of thumb (Shea, 1997). In 
order to test the exogeneity condition, we have implemented the Sargan test for overidentifying 
restrictions. The test results lead us not to reject the null hypothesis (at the 1% level of statistical 
significance) of uncorrelation of the instrumental variables to some set of residuals, thus the 
instruments are statistically validated. Second, as an overall diagnostic procedure, we have 
performed the Wald test on all the model specifications; the test results lead us to reject the null 
hypothesis of joint non statistical significance of all the parameters. Statistical details are reported at 






                                                 
4 Notice that OLS estimation results of equation (1) also show a negative partial effect of shareholder 
protection on country-level innovation activity. These estimation results are not reported but are provided 
by the author upon request. 
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5.2. Robustness checks. 
 
Even if the results presented in the previous sub-section are shown to be robust to different 
measures of innovation, two further arguments may be offered against attributing economic meaning 
to our findings. 
First, it may be argued that the indicator of minority shareholder protection by Pagano and Volpin 
(2005) is inaccurate (see, for example, Enriques, 2002). As Spamann (2006) points out, the most 
basic issue for coding of legal variables like the shareholder rights index is whether only mandatory 
rules, default rules, or optional rules should be counted. While Djankov et al. (2008) explicitly coded 
for default rules, La Porta et al. (1998) and Pagano and Volpin (2005) did not take an explicit 
position, although they seem to have been primarily concerned with default rules. To use default or 
optional rules in our analysis may not allow us to validly compare shareholder protection across 
countries. Indeed, the default and optional rules’ substantive content does not matter very much in 
the presence of low transaction costs (this is nothing more than a relatively straightforward 
application of the Coase Theorem, Coase, 1960), which in turn substantially vary across countries 
depending on the efficiency of the legal systems.  
Second, one may object that the informal character of shareholder activism entails that 
shareholders can operate outside the limits of shareholder power defined by national regulation 
(Brav et al, 2008). In some countries, like United States, small investors can easily circumvent the 
existing legal devices regulating shareholder voice and engage private negotiations with boards, in 
turn affecting corporations’ investments and performance. As a result, an index measuring national 
legal rules of minority shareholder protection may not capture all the ways through which small 
investors can influence corporate production strategies and innovation. 
In order to check the robustness of our estimation results to the first point, we perform two cross-
section model specifications counting only mandatory rules in the shareholder protection indicator. 
In this case, we use the revised index by Spamann (2006), which uses the original variable definition 
from La Porta et al. (1998) and allows us to distinguish mandatory rules from default and optional 
rules. The revised index by Spamann (2006) refers to 1996 only. In the first cross-section model 
specification, we measure innovation activity by the number of patents over a ten-year interval and 
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exploit a sample of 46 observations; in the second one, we use R&D spending as an indicator of 
innovation activity and are forced to consider only 33 observations because of some missing data. 
We include a further control variable in these two model specifications, namely a measure of the 
country trade openness (Openness), calculated as the sum of merchandise exports and imports 
divided by the value of GDP (source: World Bank, 2008). 
With respect to the second point, we undertake a panel model specification in which we include 48 
country-dummies. So doing, we explicitly estimate country fixed effects capturing the influence of 
those unobservable factors that affect shareholder activism and, through this, corporations’ 
innovation at an aggregated level as well as the role played by potential country level time-invariant 
omitted variables.
5 
Results of these robustness checks are reported in Table 3. Models (1) and (2) are cross-section 
specifications in which minority shareholder rights are measured by means of the Spamann (2006)’s 
index and where a reduced number of controls is included in order to save the number of degrees of 
freedom; model (3) is a panel model in which country fixed effects are estimated (in Table 3 they are 
not reported for reasons of space), while the shareholder protection index by Pagano and Volpin 
(2005) is used. Notice also that, while in model specifications (1) and (3) reported in Table 3 we use 
a weighted number of patents as an indicator of innovation, R&D spending is used in model 
specification (2). 
Our main result is shown to be robust both to a different measure of minority shareholder 
protection and to the presence of unobservable factors affecting innovation directly or indirectly 
through, for example, informal shareholder activism. As can be seen in Table 3, we find that an 
index of minority shareholder protection has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
innovation in all the three model specifications considered.  
Interestingly, (unreported) estimated country fixed effects (obtained by including 47 country-
dummies in the panel model specification (3), the US dummy being excluded) show that Germany’s 
unobserved factors have a positive effect on innovation. Indeed, being the United States the 
benchmark, the estimated parameter for Germany is shown to be positive and statistically significant 
                                                 
5 For instance, countries that tend to exhibit a concentrated corporate ownership structure may show, 
keeping other factors constant, a lower level of innovative investment projects, to the extent that a 
reduction of managerial discretion by large outside shareholders is detrimental to firm-specific 
investments (see, e.g., Burkart et al., 1997). 
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at the 1% level, what is consistent with the argument that some unobserved factors characterizing the 
United States in comparison with Germany, such as a larger informal shareholder activism, may 
have a negative effect on innovation. 
 
Table 3. Cross-country estimation results: robustness checks (3SLS, all industries). 





PANEL - FIXED  EFFECTS 
‡ 
             
VARIABLE    INN as: 
Patents - weight: pop. - 
INN as: 
R&D (% GDP) 
INN as:  
Patents - weight: pop. - 
                
Eq. 1. Innovation    Coef. (Std.Err.)   Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.) 
                
ShPr 
†    -195.053  (116.124) *    -0.291  (0.151) *    -128.117   (31.477) *** 
MkCap     469.649  (179.681) ***     0.768  (0.181) ***     575.083   (111.222) *** 
WorkPart (low)   benchmark    benchmark    benchmark  
WorkPart (medium)     843.924  (244.382) ***     0.958  (0.308) ***    -330.722   (115.319) *** 
WorkPart (high)     1549.657  (257.349) ***     1.307  (0.335) ***     467.670   (142.032) *** 
Ind (low)   benchmark    benchmark    benchmark  
Ind (medium)     61.489  (324.743)   -0.360  (0.413)     27.001   (31.114) 
Ind (high)     582.937  (654.226)     1.194  (0.571) **     12.600   (53.075) 
Pat      --    --      --    --     1.661  (0.444) *** 
Openness    -2.002  (2.380)    -0.003  (0.001) *      --    -- 
Constant    -927.862  (520.382) *    -0.554  (0.688)    -1780.01   (433.631) *** 
                
Eq. 2. Market Cap.    Coef. (Std.Err.)   Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.) 
                
ShPr 
†     0.291  (0.113) ***     0.357  (0.151) **     0.184   (0.043) *** 
WorkPart (low)   benchmark    benchmark    benchmark  
WorkPart (medium)    -0.703  (0.304) **    -0.867  (0.351) **     -0.894   (0.226) *** 
WorkPart (high)    -1.164  (0.356) ***    -1.378  (0.413) ***    -1.853   (0.230) *** 
Gdp    -0.000  (0.000)      0.001  (0.000) *     0.001   (0.000) *** 
Rule      --    --      --    --     0.266   (0.065) *** 
Gov     0.836  (0.196) ***     0.602  (0.227) ***      --    -- 
Constant     2.464  (0.365) ***     1.800  (0.461) ***     2.859   (0.259) *** 
                
STATISTICAL DETAILS:              
                  
Number of obs.      46      33      476 
Wald test - eq. (1): p-value 0.000      0.000      0.000 
Wald test - eq. (2): p-value 0.000      0.000      0.000 
I stage fit [R-square]    0.499     0.496     0.877 
Sargan test [H0, at 1%]  accepted       accepted     accepted 
                
Note: “*” = 10% significance, “**” = 5% significance, “***” = 1% significance. 
† ShPrit: default rules (in panel 
estimation), mandatory rules (in cross-section estimation). 
‡ Country fixed effects not reported. 
 
We also find, in model specification (1), that the degree of the country trade openness (Openness) 
does not affect the country-level production of patents in a statistical significant way, while results of 
the model specification (2) show that the trade openness has a negative effect on the country R&D 
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spending at the 10% level of statistical significance, what is consistent with previous findings 
(Furman et al., 2002). 
Finally, these estimation results are validated by the diagnostic analysis, whose statistical details 
are reported at the bottom of Table 3. 
  
5.3. Industry heterogeneity. 
 
We also explore how the relation between countries’ innovation and national legal institutions of 
shareholder protection varies across industries. Indeed, some industries are relatively more in need 
of external finance, as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998). For instance, telecommunications 
and information technology productions are shown to be more dependent on external financing, 
while process engineering (e.g., food processing, paper and materials processing) less. This implies 
that, ceteris paribus, the stock market development should have a greater influence on innovation 
activity in an industry such as electrical engineering than in process or mechanical engineering, 
which requires little external finance. In turn, this may affect the intensity of the marginal effect of 
the institutions of shareholder protection on countries’ innovation performance, to the extent that 
“finance-hungry” industries are more opened to small stockholders’ equity investments. In order to 
explore this heterogeneity dimension and to provide more precise estimation results, we perform 
industry-specific versions of the model. Specifically, we group patent data according to the 5-
industry ISI-INIPI-OST Classification System as follows: (i) electrical engineering and information 
and telecommunications technology, (ii) optics, instruments and medical technology, (iii) chemistry 
and pharmaceuticals, (iv) paper and printing, material processing, metallurgy and process 
engineering, and (v) transport and mechanical engineering. Results of this further method are 
reported in Table 4. The left column reports the variables, while the remaining columns report the 
estimated parameters of industry-specific models. In all the model specifications reported from 
column (1) to column (5) of Table 4, innovation activity is measured by the number of patents of a 
five-year period weighted by the country’s population, while we use the shareholder protection index 
from Pagano and Volpin (2005). 
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VARIABLE   
INN as: 
Patents 




- weight: pop. - 
INN as: 
Patents 
- weight: pop. - 
INN as: 
Patents 




- weight: pop. - 
                
Eq. 1. Innovation    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.) 
                
ShPr 
†   -4.854   -4.063   -3.406   -2.872   -3.543 
    (2.851) *    (1.461) ***    (1.248) ***    (1.120) ***    (1.259) *** 
MkCap     17.186     8.680     7.622     5.831     6.514 
    (5.949) ***    (3.188) ***    (2.676) ***    (2.240) **    (2.639) ** 
WorkPart (low)    benchmark   benchmark   benchmark   benchmark   benchmark 
                
WorkPart (medium)     18.622     7.678     2.623     3.722     3.168 
   (7.151)  ***   (3.492)  **   (2.747)   (2.589)   (2.918) 
WorkPart (high)     70.988     10.956     7.373     4.446     8.356 
   (9.391)  ***   (4.225)  ***   (3.313)  *   (3.216)   (3.697)  ** 
Ind (low)    benchmark    benchmark    benchmark    benchmark    benchmark 
                
Ind (medium)   -0.740     2.511     3.717     2.517     4.415 
   (7.187)   (3.383)   (2.661)   (2.488)   (2.802)   
Ind (high)     19.929     16.528     12.545     8.071     7.285 
   (15.626)   (7.530)  **   (5.816)  *   (5.436)   (6.084) 
Pat     4.289     5.169     4.736     5.181     4.941 
    (0.179) ***    (0.132) ***    (0.123) ***    (0.104) ***    (0.089) *** 
Constant   -39.548   -17.871   -16.727   -11.781   -12.995 
   (18.098)  **    (9.288) *    (7.405) **    (6.887) *    (7.571) * 
                    
Eq. 2. Market Cap.    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.) 
                
ShPr 
†     0.173     0.173     0.174     0.174     0.174 
    (0.034) ***    (0.034) ***    (0.034) ***    (0.034) ***    (0.034) *** 
WorkPart (low)    benchmark   benchmark   benchmark   benchmark   benchmark 
                
WorkPart (medium)   -0.290   -0.290   -0.290   -0.289   -0.287 
    (0.115) **     (0.114) **    (0.114) *     (0.114) **     (0.114) **  
WorkPart (high)   -0.598   -0.599   -0.598   -0.597   -0.595 
    (0.145) ***    (0.145) ***    (0.145) ***    (0.145) ***    (0.145) *** 
Gdp     0.001     0.001     0.001     0.001     0.001 
    (0.000) ***     (0.000) ***    (0.000) ***     (0.000) ***    (0.000) *** 
Rule     0.467     0.465     0.466     0.468     0.472 
    (0.070) ***    (0.069) ***    (0.069) ***     (0.069) ***    (0.069) *** 
Constant     2.690     2.689     2.206     2.690     2.692 
    (0.127) ***    (0.127) ***    (0.135) ***    (0.127) ***    (0.127) *** 
                
Note: “*” = 10% significance, “**” = 5% significance, “***” = 1% significance. 
† ShPrit: default rules. 
 
When the estimation is performed on industry-specific samples, our main conclusion does not 
change, as the estimated coefficient relating the shareholder protection index remains negative and 
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statistically significant at the 1% level across sectors. In addition, industry specific regressions reveal 
that the effect of the market capitalization on innovation activity is higher in those sectors that rely 
relatively more on external funding (such as electrical engineering), what in turn is related to a 
stronger negative effect of the minority shareholder protection institutions. At the opposite, an 
industry such as process engineering, which is relatively less dependent on external finance, shows a 
weaker link between stock markets, investor protection and innovation. 
Again, we are induced by the diagnostic analysis to never reject the statistical validity of our 
estimation results. See Table 5 for details. 
 
Table 5. Diagnostics: industry-specific models. 























                
Number of obs.    476    476  476  476    476 
Wald test - eq. (1): p-v.   0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000 
Wald test - eq. (2): p-v.   0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000 
I stage fit [R-square]   0.375    0.375  0.375  0.375    0.375 
Sargan test [H0, at 1%]   accepted   accepted  accepted  accepted    accepted 
                
 
 
6.  Concluding remarks  
 
Most of the “law and finance” literature argues that national legal rules protecting small investors 
positively affect long-run performance of countries, by boosting the stock markets. In this paper, we 
have empirically challenged this argument, by focusing, in particular, on country innovation 
performance, which is central to the long-term development of market economies. We have 
performed panel and cross-section estimation using data over the 1993-2006 period and found that 
countries with stronger shareholder protection show larger market capitalization but also lower 
innovation activity, after controlling for those variables that are commonly advocated to strongly 
affect country innovation performance.  
We have interpreted this result as follows. It is true that the risk of expropriation at the expenses of 
individual stockholders is likely to occur as a consequence of block-holder discretion where 
corporate law is weak in providing small investors with formal legal means of control. However, an 
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increased minority shareholder protection may merely replace one set of problems with another. 
Indeed, nothing ensures that the small shareholders will not use their increased power to siphon off 
benefits for themselves. Minority shareholders, such as hedge funds and mutual funds, often hold 
pools of assets across a wide variety of investment strategies in different corporations and are less 
likely to take interest in long-term corporate results than those who have their wealth 
disproportionately invested in a given company. Knowledge intensive productions, in particular, 
may result negatively affected by strong minority shareholder protection, since the high specificity 
of the investments necessary to innovative activities exposes undiversified shareholders to 
opportunistic actions of small and (extensively) diversified stockholders, causing ex-ante incentive 
distortion in corporate investment strategies. 
Moreover, we have showed that our estimation results are unlikely to be driven by omitted 
variables bias or misspecification problems, since we cope with endogeneity of the market 
capitalization and industry heterogeneity and check the robustness of the results to possible 
measurement errors and omitted variables. 
In our opinion, this paper’s findings may bear on two different areas of the current research. First, 
they suggest that the benign effect of a stronger shareholder protection traditionally advocated by the 
“law and finance” literature might need to be reconsidered, at least partly. Second, in the context of 
the literature on innovation, this paper provides some evidence that innovation is not simply a 
consequence of profit maximizing behavior of firms, rather it is institutionally embedded, and that a 
system of corporate governance may be an important factor shaping innovation abilities of 
corporations and countries. Finally, our findings have straightforward implications on legally policy 
matters, as they may advise legal policymakers to take into account that small shareholders may use 
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